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Abstract:
Hungary and Poland have attempted to establish democratic systems of
government since the end of Soviet occupation in 1991. Recently, both states have
elected leaders who have started to manipulate their democratic institution into one that
seems not so democratic; both Hungary and Poland have manipulated their judicial
branch into one that now serves only their own interests. Leaders in Hungary and Poland
have shown their support for regimes such as those in Russia, China, and Turkey. What
factors contribute to democratically elected officials shifting towards authoritarianism in
post Eastern-Bloc countries? From Samuel P Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, to
Levitsky and Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die, scholars have examined key factors that
contribute to the stability and downfall of democracies. This thesis examines the
countries of Hungary and Poland, whose democracies are in decline. The study expected
a correlation between the loss of democracy in Hungary and Poland, as a result of their
recent history as satellite states of the USSR. The case study found no direct correlation
between the two countries’ history as part of the Eastern-Bloc; their authoritarian leaders
were able to exploit the weaknesses of Hungary and Poland in the precise ways that
allowed them to gain more power.
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Introduction
Democracies are seen as the most ideal form of government for a nation. There
are many benefits to democratic nations, and many downsides to illiberal democracies.
For the larger international benefits, Democratic Peace theory states that democracies are
much less likely to go to war with other democracies. Democracies have more motivation
to keep peaceful relations with other democracies; meanwhile, governments leaning
towards authoritarianism put their citizens at risk and embroil their government with
corruption and consolidated power. Studying the loss of democracy is just as important as
studying the establishment of successful democracies. In 2019, many democratic nations
gradually shifted systems of governance; leaders and parties ruled by shaping regimes
into forms of illiberal democracies with authoritarian tendencies. It is necessary to
address the causes of this occurrence to have better ideas of warning signs, and protect
citizens from undergoing harm in corrupt systems. This thesis asks what factors
contribute to democratically elected leaders shifting to authoritarian regimes in post
Eastern-Bloc countries.
Hungarian president Viktor Orban, founder of the Fidesz party, used to be in
support of defeating the Soviet Union, and helping Hungary establish a new democracy.
Today, the president resembles an autocrat, taking any opportunity to influence and
control the citizens of Hungary. All major media outlets in Hungary are controlled by one
business, the board members of which are all allies and friends of Orban. The majority
party in Hungary is run by Orban’s Fidesz party, and the judicial courts are packed with
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Orban allies, providing him with a network of support in all branches of government and
no check on his power. Following closely in his footsteps is Jarosław Kaczyński, the
leader of Poland’s Law and Justice Party. Arguably faced with slightly more resistance
than Orban, Kaczyński has attempted to manipulate the courts in his favor, and similarly
placed allies in powerful positions. Orban and Kaczyński are openly supportive of each
other, and Orban has envisioned what he labels as an “illiberal democracy” for Hungary.
Scholars from Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, to Steven Levitsky
and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die, have discussed the ways in which
democracies are at risk. This research into different factors that cause a retrogression
from solid democracies is thorough, but a gap in literature appears with region specific
research. As mentioned by scholar Aron Buzogany, there is a lack of research into the
“ideational foundations of these developments” (Buzogany and Varga, 822). This paper
used a case study method to examine the recent authoritarian tendencies of Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and
Justice Party (PiS) in Poland. In post Eastern-Bloc countries, their past Soviet occupation
leaves a potential for a correlation between their recent communist past and current
at-risk democracies. This study argues that there must be a correlation between the loss of
democracy in Hungary and Poland, as a result of their recent history as satellite states of
the USSR.
Beginning with an explanation of past literature supporting theories and factors
contributing to a shift towards an illiberal democracy, this thesis then used the works of
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Juan Linz and Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt to conduct a case study of Hungary and
Poland. In order to determine possible factors, an analysis of the current situation in
Hungary and Poland over the past 10-15 years was conducted. Many scholars examine
specific areas of failing democracies, but in order to find correlations between different
threats to democracy, it is necessary to look at all potential threats. The case study begins
with an analysis of the constitutions of Hungary and Poland, and the behaviors and
actions of their two leaders. Then this thesis examined whether there are institutional
norms to protect the democracies of Hungary and Poland and end with a conclusion of
results and findings from the case study.

Literature Review
Since the birth of democracy, scholars have discussed what factors make up a
democracy, and the causes of its success or failure. As the world has grown more
complex, the discussion of what is crucial for the survival of a democracy is ongoing and
necessary. Because there are constantly new democracies trying to gain a solid and stable
system of government, and autocrats testing the power of even the most established
democracies, it is pivotal to continue developing a better understanding. Democratic
systems of government are considered by many scholars to be the most ideal form of
government, and therefore it is important to know about factors that can contribute to its
failure.
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Democratic systems are the most promising form of government for the Western
world. Russett (1993) writes about the idea of democratic peace, and describes why a
liberal democratic system is the most desirable, and how it constitutes the best system for
global peacekeeping. Russet explains that the habits of democratic institutions are more
likely to have peaceful resolutions to conflicts, avoiding wars with other democratic
institutions (Russet, 4). In Grasping the Democratic Peace, Russet (1993) explains how
democratic norms and culture create this idea, and how democracies are peaceful on a
structural and institutional level.
What makes a democratic system possible?
Although there are many definitions of a democracy, most scholars agree on some
essential parts of a government that allow for a democracy to be successful. Linz (1996)
groups the principles of a modern consolidated democracy into five categories: civil
society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic society (Problems of
Democratic Transition 1 4). All of these arenas demand both support and mediation from
one another. Juan Linz provides an explanation of this interconnectedness.
“ For example, civil society in a democracy needs the support of a rule of
law that guarantees the right of association and needs the support of a state
apparatus that will effectively impose legal sanctions on those who would
attempt to use illegal means to stop groups from exercising their
democratic right to organize. Furthermore, each arena in the democratic
system has an effect on other arenas. For example, political society crafts
the constitution and major laws, manages the state apparatus, and produces
the overall regulatory framework for economic society. In a consolidated
democracy, therefore, there are constant mediations between the arenas,
each of which is correctly in the ‘field’ of forces emanating from the other
arenas” (Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition 15).
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All variables are needed to ensure healthy democratic consolidation, and all variables rely
on the existence of the others for a strong democracy. This becomes evident as
Huntington (2009) uses Linz’s theory to describe the wave of democratization at the end
of the Cold War.
From this discussion, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) add on Linz’s work. Levitsky
and Ziblatt (2018) discuss important elements of a democracy that must be in place to
prevent autocrats from rising to power and corrupting the system. Political parties, strong
constitutions, upkeep of democratic norms, and a system of checks and balances, are all
factors of a democracy that are necessary to the prevention of autocratic rulers coming to
power. Fareed Zakaria (2003) and Samuel Huntington (1991) agree that the current idea
of a democracy must go beyond its original meaning of “rule by the people.” A country
that embodies how we see a democracy needs more than free elections to avoid the
potential for autocratic leaders taking away the rights and systems that most consider to
be fundamental.
It becomes evident democratic consolidation is not solely based on the rules
implemented in a nation’s structure and constitution; Zakaria (2003) writes, “democracy
has gone from being a form of government to a way of life” (14). He argues the society
created today is a result of the democratization of economy, democratization of culture,
and, more recently, the democratization of technology and information; this is what
allows for the freedoms and opportunities included in the world’s perception of a
democratic society today (Zakaria 14-15). The original and most basic ideas of
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democracy have retained these same values, but, over time, in order to uphold those
values and freedoms, democratic ideals must be more widespread than the structure of
government itself.
Loss of Democracy
Democracies have become fragile, and an authoritarian regime often rises to
power from them. Samuel Huntington (1991) describes the causes of a “reverse wave” of
democratization in “Democracy’s Third Wave.” He argues obstacles to democratization
are political, cultural, and economic; issues within each of these groups can be found in
most countries that are struggling with a potential reversal of their democratization.
Huntington discusses that these states may have weak democratic values from key elite
groups and from the public, along with terrorism or insurgency resulting in a breakdown
of law and order, or intervention by a non democratic foreign power have the ability to
cause a reverse wave of democratization (Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave”
17-18).
Scholars Juan Linz (1996), Steven Levitsky, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018) have
developed and agreed upon their “litmus test,” which includes what they say are four key
indicators of authoritarian behavior. These four factors are: rejection (or weak
commitment to) democratic rules of the game, denial of the legitimacy of political
opponents, toleration or encouragement of violence, and readiness to curtail civil liberties
of opponents, including media (Levitsky and Ziblatt 23-24). In addition to these key signs
from leaders, they also describe the actions leaders will take to manipulate different parts
of the system in order to have leadership positions taken up by their supporters.
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Huntington also describes culture as a main contributor that could pose a threat to
democracy, certain cultures are particularly hostile to democracy, but they don’t
necessarily prohibit democratization (“Democracy’s Third Wave” 23).
Obstacles for Democracy in Post Eastern-Bloc countries
Huntington (2009) uses Linz’s categorizations of different
liberalization/democratization processes when describing the transitions in the 1974-1990
wave of democratization. In this analysis, Hungary is described as transformation
(labeled as reforma b y Linz) and Poland as transplacement (a combination of Linz’s
reforma a nd ruptura) in their processes (Huntington, “How Countries Democratize” 34).
Transformation is described as occurring when “the elites in power took the lead in
bringing about democracy,” and transplacement when “democratization resulted largely
from joint action by government and opposition groups” (“How Countries Democratize”
35). Huntington (2009) continues to add that there was no correlation between the nature
of authoritarian regime and democratic transition (“How Countries Democratize” 35).
Buzogany and Varga (2018) have recent literature for the discussion of
post-Soviet countries and their illiberal democracies. They argue educational institutions
have influenced this change in ideology and acceptance of illiberal democratic ideals.
Most importantly, that “despite the strong interest in the factors facilitating the ‘illiberal
backlash’ in Central and Eastern Europe and its practical implications, there has been
relatively little research on the ideational foundations of these developments” (Buzogany
and Varga, 822). Conservative intellectuals push against core democratic ideals, such as
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checks and balances, individual rights, and judicialization of politics; as a result this
anti-democratic discourse becomes normal in a society (Buzogany and Varga, 822).
Buzogany and Varga (2018) claim Hungary’s “illiberal backlash” is partially due
to ideational views in Hungary during this time. Hungarian intellectuals were “receptive
to post WWII Western conservative critiques of liberalism” (Buzogany and Varga, 814).
When Hungary was developing its democratic ideals, there were many trusted
intellectuals criticizing liberal democratic principles. This led to Buzogany and Varga’s
findings that “rather than considering Hungarian intellectuals as located merely at the
receiving end of Western illiberalism, we find that the search for alternatives to liberalism
was initiated by Hungarian intellectuals themselves” (Buzogany and Varga, 814). While
this trend in scholarly work in Hungary is just one element, it may influence the upkeep
of democratic principles and norms.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Hungary and Poland, along with
other Eastern Bloc states, began their journey to establish new democratic governments.
Poland was the first to spark political revolutions, which eventually led to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, making it seem that their democratic spirit was high. They were
seen as the “most rebellious Warsaw Pact member,” having four previous social
upheavals (Levesque 236). In the 1981 uprising, Poland’s Solidarity organization was 10
million strong, and Soviet leaders even agreed to not intervene for fear of extreme
retaliation; eventually Polish leader Jaruzelski established a military coup in December
1981 and quickly suppressed Solidarity (Levesque 314). Ideologically, Poland appeared
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promising for the hopes of future democratic consolidation. Hungary, often grouped with
Poland in the latter years of the Cold War, generally had more resistance to Soviet
communism. The two countries were grouped separately from other Eastern-Bloc
countries, being more agreeable to “experiments in democratization,” compared to the
much more hesitant East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania (Levesque
315). The two countries were among the first to implement democratic regimes during
Gorbachev’s rule. As Hungary and Poland exited the Cold War, the two countries
appeared to be some of the most promising for democratic consolidation.

Hungary and Poland began the process of democratization on what appeared to be
solid ground, but democracies are fragile. Scholars have determined the elements needed
to establish a consolidated liberal democracy, what norms must be in place to keep it, and
elements that prove to be destructive to democracies. There is not enough research into
how a decline in democracy may affect different regions of the world, and in this case
post Eastern-Bloc countries. Region specific history may show a trend when examining
obstacles of democratic consolidation. To determine whether there are specific factors in
Poland and Hungary which have allowed for their current leaders to shift towards an
authoritarian leadership, many factors must be examined.

9

Theoretical Framework
Democracy is generally viewed as the most ideal form of government, providing
citizens with rights and freedoms, and a ruling class made to serve its citizens; however,
today we see a decline in democratic governance in countries that previously boasted
democracies. Unexpectedly, countries around the world, particularly in Eastern Europe
are becoming less democratic, and are electing leaders whose values do not align with a
democratic system. This is unexpected for many post Soviet countries, because many of
them were on a path to having stable democratic systems after emerging from the USSR.
Along with other sure signs of a solid democratic foundation, such as establishing checks
and balances and forming civil society organizations, this thesis argues that these
countries' past must have contributed to some correlation with their failures today.
This thesis defines democracy as  “a system of government with regular, free and
fair elections, in which all adult citizens have the right to vote and possess basic civil
liberties such as freedom of speech and association” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 6). For the
sake of clarification, authoritarian regimes are defined as “‘political systems with limited,
not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with
distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at
some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group
exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’”
(Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition 38).
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Democratization theory, as developed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) and
built upon by Samuel Huntington (2009), is used to establish variables necessary for
democratic consolidation and factors that contribute to a decline in democratic values.
This thesis utilizes a comparative approach to reveal what factors contribute to a decline
in liberal democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). More recently, there has been increased
awareness for the autocratic tendencies of Eastern European leaders. Because Hungary
and Poland are two of the most prominent countries showing signs of an illiberal
democracy, they were used as cases to determine what factors of failing democracies are
consistent within the post Eastern-Bloc region. The two countries are headed down
similar paths under autocratic rule, and, because of their history of Soviet occupation, this
thesis looked for patterns that contribute to a lack of democratic consolidation. The
thesis argued that the case study would find a correlation between the backsliding in
democracy in Hungary and Poland, and their history as satellite states of the Soviet
Union.

Data Collection and Methodology
This thesis used a Hypothesis-Generating case study (Levy 2008). Case study
method is applied to examine this idea of failing and illiberal democracies in
post-communist Eastern Europe, as they do not fit in with the hopeful predictions of their
new democracies. Levy (2008) discusses the potential for case studies to “refine and
sharpen existing hypotheses in any research strategy involving an ongoing dialogue of
theory and evidence” (5). This thesis examines Hungary and Poland in relation to the
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work of Buzogany and Varga (2018) in their discussions of post-Communist European
societies, and the issues that contribute to their troubled democratic systems.
Additionally, factors to determine authoritarian behavior and weaknesses in democracies
were developed from Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s factors needed for democratic
consolidation, as well as Huntington (2009), and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018).
The data used included an analysis of different aspects of democratic values and
their flaws, as well as factors of authoritarian leaders suggested by Levitsky and Ziblatt.
Howard (2003) uses Juan Linz’s litmus test, but since his study, Levitsky and Ziblatt
have finished Linz’s incomplete work to achieve a more comprehensive framework
describing authoritarian behavior. Using Hungary and Poland as cases, their constitutions
were examined for signs of loopholes that would allow an authoritarian leader to rise to
power. The variables of a strong constitution used were: time period the constitution was
written (after or during Soviet rule), the system of checks and balances, a separation of
powers, term limits, a bill of rights, and the recognition of political parties. The next
section examined the leaders themselves, and looked at the authoritarian behaviors of
Viktor Orban and Jarosław Kaczyński. The four variables of authoritarian behavior used
were the following: rejection of democratic rules of the game, denial of legitimacy of
political opponents, toleration of violence, and readiness to curtail civil liberties of
opponents, as developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018). Democratic norms are essential
to the preservation of a healthy democracy; norms of mutual toleration, institutional
forbearance, and polarization were examined in the instances of Hungary and Poland.
Another variable is threats to democracy, as described by scholars such as Huntington,
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Zakaria, and Levitsky and Ziblatt. The final variables looked at the ideological state of
educational institutions during the period of the end of Soviet rule and into the
establishment of Hungary and Poland’s new democracies. In this final section, the other
variables identified as threats to democracy were a negative public opinion of democracy,
a poor economy, significant event/crisis, refugees used as a threat.
In order to assess these factors, both Polish and Hungarian newspapers were
used, along with articles from newspapers outside the two countries, reporting on the
social and political developments of Hungary and Poland. The data used to examine
recent actions and ideological positions of president Jarosław Kaczyński of Poland and
his PiS party were obtained from articles in the following newspapers ranging from July
2016 to August 2019: Reuters, Foreign Affairs, Politico, Foreign Policy, The New York
Times, a long with Polish newspapers Krakow Post,  a nd Warsaw Voice. F
 or data to
examine Viktor Orban of Hungary and the Fidesz Party, the articles from the newspapers
used were: Foreign Policy, The New York Times, Times Higher Education, The New
Yorker, a nd Hungarian newspaper Direkt36, r anging from November 2014 to December
2019. Copies of both Poland and Hungary’s constitutions were used from their respective
official government websites, sejm.gov and kormany.hu in order to look for potential
specific weaknesses in their constitutions. Scholars Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), along
with Buzogany and Varga (2018) mentioned in the literature review were used for data
collection of both countries’ governments and their actions.
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Findings and Analysis: Hungary and Poland
From the beginning of Viktor Orban’s presidency in 2010 and when Jarosław
Kaczyński’s PiS party took control of the Polish government in 2015, both leaders have
been shaping their respective countries into illiberal democracies taking on increasingly
authoritative tendencies. Following their taking of power, they have managed to keep it,
despite protests from citizens (Kingsley “Opposition in Hungary;” Barteczko and
Sobczak). Both leaders are eager to attempt any opportunity to grasp more control. With
Kaczyński praising Orban as a role model for his “illiberal democracy,” he follows
closely behind Hungary’s president, his “ideological ally on the political right,” putting
Poland on a path to authoritarian rule (Cienski). Fareed Zakaria (2003) warned about the
dangers of an illiberal democracy for a country, and it is evident that both Hungary and
Poland are heading in a dangerous direction.
Hungary’s President, Viktor Orban, and the man in charge of Poland’s PiS party,
Jarosław Kaczyński will be used for this case study. Kaczyński may no longer hold a
leadership position in the Polish government, but recent scholars would agree he is the
man behind all of the decisions made by the Polish government through 2019
(Markowski). In an article for Politico, Jan Cienski addresses Kaczyński’s leadership
and control over the Law and Justice party, which in turn rules the Polish government.
Kaczyński does not hold an official position in office, but he chose Prime Minister Beata
Szydło and President Andrzej Duda for their positions; and he said “no one doubts he is
the man in charge in Warsaw” (Cienski). This case study examines features of the
democracies in Hungary and Poland that hold the potential for reversing their backslide
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into autocratic tendencies. It is important to look at a country’s foundation, i.e. its
constitution, to see what protections are evident or left for a wide range of interpretation.
Additionally, this study examines the behaviors of Hungary and Poland’s ruling party
leaders, and to what extent they display autocratic behaviors. Also crucial to democratic
consolidation are the upkeep of unwritten norms, and additional threats to a democracy
known to test a state’s democratic system.
Constitutional Safeguards
Authors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue even countries with strong
constitutions that contain preventative measures can fall subject to a decline in
democratic values with an authoritarian leader (98). They claim keeping democratic
norms are the essential element for survival of democracies. Regardless, it is necessary to
evaluate the constitutions of these countries to determine if there are any essential flaws
at the basic level. I assess the potential for flaws within the Hungarian and Polish
constitutions, and then continue to examine other elements that may be flawed within
these countries that allow for their slipping democracies. There are six variables of a
strong democratic constitution. The variables are: when the constitution was written,
checks and balances, a separation of powers, presidential term limits, a bill of rights, and
the recognition of political parties (See Table 1).
Table 1: Protections in the Constitution
When
Written

Checks
and
Balances

Separation
of powers

Presidential
term limits

Bill of rights

Recognition of
political parties

Hungary

2011

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Poland

1997

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Both countries have constitutions written after their separation from the Soviet
Union, however, Hungary’s constitution was not written until 2011, under Viktor Orban’s
leadership. Hungary may have received the new constitution it needed (the previous
constitution was created while under Soviet rule in 1949), but with Orban writing the
rules, it left room for the laws to be stretched in the Fidesz party’s favor. Although both
constitutions originally had the protections that ensure democratic values on a basic level,
both leaders implemented policies or made changes which undermine these rules and
values set forth by their constitutions (Levitsky and Ziblatt 80). Hungary’s constitution
states that before dissolving the national assembly, “the president must address the Prime
Minister, the Speaker of the national Assembly, and the leaders of the parliamentary
groups” (Article 3, sec. 4). Viktor Orban has assured these positions were filled by
companions who are in agreement with him and his vision for Hungary. In addition, he
was able to manipulate the size of the courts and appoint the members of his choosing. If
every position that makes up the system of checks and balances in Hungary is a friend or
ally of Orban, the system of checks and balances and other constitutional protections
becomes meaningless.
An almost mirror image of this is reflected in Kaczyński’s PiS party within the
Polish government (Levitsky and Ziblatt 80). Kaczyński did not have the advantage of
being the one to write the constitution, as Poland’s constitution was written in 1997.
Because Kaczyński is known to be the man in charge of the PiS party, the roles in all
branches of government are controlled and influenced by him. With both leaders
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consolidating their power, they managed to invalidate some of the fundamental
democratic policies in their respective constitutions.
Authoritarian Behavior
Table 2 exhibits the authoritarian behaviors of Hungary and Poland’s leaders,
Viktor Orban and Jarosław Kaczyński. Using Levitsky and Ziblatt’s findings, an initial
assessment of both Orban and Kaczyński’s actions show authoritarian behaviors. Both
countries were studied by Levitsky and Ziblatt and they found that both regimes were
“mildly authoritarian” (187).
Table 2: Authoritarian Behavior
Rejection of
democratic rules
of the game

Denial of
legitimacy of
political
opponents

Toleration or
encouragement
of violence

Readiness to
curtail civil
liberties of
opponents,
including media

Hungary- Orban

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Poland-Kaczyński

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

The characteristics of authoritarian behavior outlined by Levitsky and Ziblatt
include: rejection of democatic rules of the game, denial of legitimacy of political
opponents, toleration or encouragement of violence, and readiness to curtail civil liberties
of opponents. The first variable is “rejection of the democratic rules of the game.” Both
Orban and Kaczyński have publicly expressed their discontent with a liberal democratic
society (Lyman and Smale; Cienski). In a report describing Orban’s speech in the
summer of 2014, Orban reportedly “praised ‘illiberal democracies’ in Turkey, China,
Singapore, and Russia” (Lyman and Smale). They have become closer companions with
each other, also among them Serbia’s president Alexander Vucic. Orban wrote a new
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constitution after being elected that allowed for loopholes so he would be able to change
democratic principles that did not benefit him (Scheeple).
In Poland, as Jarosław Kaczyński applauds Orban’s behaviors and actions, it is no
shock that the PiS leader exhibits the same behaviors of the first factor of authoritarian
behavior (See Table 1). In 2015, when the PiS party gained control in the government,
they managed to appoint five new justices to the Constitutional Tribunal who were
loyalists to PiS, and attempted to create different judicial reforms which would remove
checks on power. The reforms included a necessary two thirds majority in the
Constitutional Tribune, giving the newly appointed PiS allies a veto power in the courts;
additionally, the reforms included legislation which fundamentally gave the parliament
even more control in different offices within the judiciary branch (Rohac). This group of
reforms was ruled unconstitutional in 2016, but no doubt shows Kaczyński’s intentions
for the PiS party to have control in all branches of government (Rohac). The laws were
vetoed by Polish President, Andrzej Duda, in defiance of Kaczyński’s wishes; Duda later
proposed his own judicial reforms which were less viable to backlash (Lyman).
The second variable involves media being used to deny the legitimacy of
opponents for both leaders, resulting in the following examples also being evidence of a
“Yes” for the fourth variable. A report from Politico d escribes PiS officials creating a
“smear campaign against judges opposed to the government’s judicial reforms” (Wanat).
Multiple attempts were made by PiS to control media campaigns of other candidates. In
Hungary, Viktor Orban not only slanders his competition, but has made moves using his
allies that allow him to influence most of the main media outlets in Hungary (Kingsley,
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“Orban and his Allies”). In November of 2018, many media owners declared the transfer
of “over 400 news websites, newspapers, television channels and radio stations to the
Central European Press and Media Foundation” (Kingsley, “Orban and his Allies”). The
group was only found in August of 2018, and its board members are made up of Orban’s
personal lawyers and two other close allies.
With Orban loyalists holding ownership of all major media outlets in the country,
he may not hold official control of what media the residents of Hungary consume, but it
does seem clear his opinions and support for his campaigns are the majority of messages
coming through Hungary’s major media outlets (Kingsley, “Orban Bends Hungarian
Society”). In addition, other independent media outlets have been systematically starved
of revenue as well as their owners’ other businesses, almost forcing them to give up their
media companies to Orban or his or censor their content about Orban (András). In
Direkt36, a n independent newspaper in Hungary, Pethő András describes the example of
Lajos Simicska, a powerful businessman who began to speak against Orban’s leadership,
and eventually ended up selling most of his assets to Orban and his friends. This dynamic
constructed by Orban leaves “yes” answers for all check marks of authoritarian behavior
besides encouragement of violence described by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt.
The above mentioned reports from throughout Kaczyński and Orban’s time in
power check three of the four criteria of authoritarian behavior, the difference being
slightly more resistance within Poland for its undemocratic policies. In Hungary, Viktor
Orban faced much less resistance for his autocratic behaviors and changes in government.
Neither leader was found to have toleration/encouragement of violence, however, the
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other criteria appear to have a strong presence in the governing actions of Jarosław
Kaczyński and Viktor Orban.
Institutional Norms
After all of the legislation and leadership behavior has been examined, there are
unwritten norms needed to keep democracies functioning. The three norms mentioned in
Table 3 are four of the crucial democratic norms outlined by Levitsky and Ziblatt, and are
now applied to the current systems in Hungary and Poland.
Table 3: Democratic Norms
Mutual toleration

Institutional forbearance

Polarization

Hungary

No

No

Yes

Poland

No

No

moderate

The democratic norms, “Mutual toleration” and “institutional forbearance,” are
defined in How Democracies Die a s a continuation of Juan Linz’s work. The first as
“politicians' collective willingness to agree to disagree” (102). The latter is defined as
respecting the “spirit” of the law and not implementing policies or taking actions which
may violate such spirit of a democracy (106). As described previously, both Viktor Orban
and Jarosław Kaczyński have used their media control to rid their systems of all of the
unwritten norms. Orban shows minimal toleration for his opponents, usually undermining
them with his control of the media, or using allies to erase other opinions (András).
Additionally, it becomes evident both men have used their power to implement
legislation and rule in an undemocratic nature, coming to “No” answers for both mutual
toleration and institutional forbearance.
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Polarization refers to the division of parties where members of one party become
“increasingly loyal to their party- and hostile to the other one” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 71).
There is extreme polarization in Hungary, as Orban invalidates all opinions of his
opponents, excluding those against him and leaving them with little voice in the
government or the media. Poland is moderate, as those in disagreement with the PiS party
have managed to have some representation, as well as those in the middle ground
(Levitsky and Ziblatt; Lyman). Poland seems to have a middle ground, between those
protesting the PiS party and officials under Jarosław Kaczyński’s wing there are officials
who acknowledge Kaczynky’s extremes, while still having a conservative political view.
Threats to democracy
After analyzing the actions of the autocratic leaders and the foundations of the
constitutions, a few remaining threats to democracy are left as easy targets or slipping
points for these nations. Historically, the circumstances listed in Table 4 can aid autocrats
in gaining support for their agendas. With inconsistency in upkeep of democratic norms
and autocrats for leaders, Hungary and Poland are left vulnerable to further threats to
democracy.
Table 4: Other Threats to Democracy
Negative Public
Opinion of
Democracy

Poor
Economy

Significant
Event/Crisis

Educational
institutions
with
conservative
values

Immigration
or refugee
problem as a
threat

History of
mistrust in
political
system/
unstable
nation
building

Hungary

Yes

Moderate

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Poland

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes
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A history of mistrust in the political system and/or unstable nation building can
easily lead to a negative public opinion of democracy. While both countries had a
communist past, other post Eastern-Bloc countries are on drastically different paths. It is
clear the previous communist history alone is not a major factor in the cause of the new
illiberal democracies. Hungary’s history during this period is summed up by Lyman and
Smale, in The New York Times, describing periods of good living under Soviet rule.
Viktor Orban was once against Russia, and a liberal in support of building Hungary’s
democracy (Lyman and Smale). Hungary’s economy was still in recovery from 2008
when the Fidesz party came to power in 2010, and the party promised economic recovery
in its’ campaign. This, along with the other variables and Orban’s control of the media
portrays a negative opinion of democracy. Orban has used surveys to blame the state of
Hungary on refugees, and reinforce his new “illiberal democracy” (Kingsley, “Orban
Bends Hungarian Society”).
In another article for The New York Times, Patrick Kingsley describes exactly
how Orban is influencing the education system, media, and even arts to his advantage.
Kingsley addresses Orban’s influence in the education system currently, influencing
textbooks to promote that “‘it can be problematic for different cultures to exist.’” In
addition, the Fidesz party has pushed out Central European University in Budapest, a
typically pro-democratic higher education institution, and even formed a new university
to “train the public officials of the future” (Kingsley). Buzogany and Varga (2018)
discuss the “ideational turn in literature” during the end of the Soviet era. This led to the
reorientation of the originally liberal FIDESZ party, which then brought about “the
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modernization of Hungarian conservatism” (Buzogany and Varga 816). This grew at
several social science departments in Budapest universities (Peter Pazmany Catholic
University and Corvinus University), while liberals and neoliberals “grouped around
Central European University” (Buzogany and Varga 816). Many of the conservative
intellectuals at these universities became political figures during the initial rise of the
FIDESZ party in 1998 (817). Hungary’s history may not be in its favor, Ekiert explains
the complexities that come with understanding the history of the nation and its correlation
to democratic consolidation.
Poland faces a notably similar situation. The Foreign Affairs a rticle by Volha
Charnysh discusses why Poland's roots makes it an easy ground for autocrats to take their
power. For example, “Poland’s fraught history of nation building, repeatedly interrupted
by wars and occupation, provides right-wing activists with a rich supply of martyrdom
and betrayal tropes to support the vision of Poland as surrounded by internal and external
enemies” making it a country with a fragile foundation for democratic consolidation
(Charnysh). The country has “Xenophobic and fundamentalist sentiments have deep
historical roots in the country” (Charnysh). This creates ground for the PiS party to
impose fears of refugees as an external crisis and also to spread hate within the country.
Jarosław’s brother Lech is now seen as one of the most influential figures in Poland after
his passing in 2010, and the PiS party’s undemocratic view was only gaining in
popularity using the above (Charnysh). Poland’s economy is doing well, leaving that out
for a potential party promise, but it is noteworthy that 86 percent of Poles “complained
that the gap between the rich and poor in Poland was too large” (Charnysh). The ties
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between a negative opinion of democracy and conservative educational institutions, plus
the use of refugees as a threat to the country, imply a chain reaction of these dangers to
democracy.
When considering all of the variables that lead to authoritarian regimes and the
breakdown of a democratic one, these Eastern European countries are left vulnerable to
this slip into authoritarianism, and their autocratic rulers are aware. It suggests there are
not only a few variables among the two countries that lead to the breakdown of their
democratic regimes. Rather it is the combination of autocrats, lack of upkeep in
democratic norms, among other known threats to democracy that allow an easy slip into a
system that more closely resembles authoritarianism. Constitutions which have a sound
foundation, still have loopholes. Almost every variable for the leaders of Hungary and
Poland was marked as clearly authoritarian, which created a pathway to power for Orban
and Kaczyński.

Conclusion
In Eastern Europe, autocrats have managed to grasp power in ostensibly
democratic ways in Hungary and Poland. Autocrats are ruling in countries that claim to
be democracies such as in Serbia and Ukraine, among many others worldwide. After
investigating the factors which indicate declining democratic values in Hungary and
Poland, it appears there are no specific variables resulting in an authoritarian shift; rather,
Hungary and Poland embody many components of at-risk democracies. The norm of
institutional forbearance is not upkept if the leader in power chooses to take actions
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which are lawful, but still undemocratic. For example, Viktor Orban has stacked the
boards of media companies with friends and allies who promote his agenda while not
allowing any opposition voices to be heard. Because the government is not “in control of
the media and it cannot be considered “state owned,” technically this is not autocratic, yet
it is. Although legal, an action like this does not practice the norm of forbearance, and, in
turn, can assist in the deterioration of other norms. With no one checking the power of the
leaders in Hungary and Poland, they are able to use other variables that leave a country’s
democracy vulnerable to gain power.
Hungary and Poland have an unsteady history and are relatively new democracies,
and this most likely correlates with the ease of public opinion to shift towards a negative
view of democracy. This research was limited in data collection, as sources from news
outlets in Hungarian and Polish were not used. Additionally, having a robust civil society
is important to democratic consolidation (Howard 2003), but this study did not collect
data concerning civil society participation in Hungary or Poland. The next step for further
research would be to determine the significance of the history of these countries, both
culturally and in their institutions, in their ability to develop secure democracies. Samuel
Huntington argues culture can pose an obstacle to democracy, but there are limits to these
cultural obstacles in democratic consolidation (“Democracy’s Third Wave” 29-30). In
summation, Huntington (1991) states, “economic development makes democracy
possible; political leadership makes it real. For democracies to come into being, future
political elites will have to believe, at a minimum, that democracy is the least bad form of
government for their societies and themselves” (“Democracy’s Third Wave” 33).
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Understanding how culture and history affect these nation’s democratic consolidation is
an essential component to further developing this area of research. Additional research is
needed to interpret the extent to which educational institutions have an effect on a
society’s opinions and beliefs on democracy. In Hungary, the more liberal democratic
scholars gravitated towards Budapest’s Central European University, with scholars in
other higher education institutions leaning to more conservative or antidemocratic views.
In March of 2017, Viktor Orban attempted to shut down the university’s Budapest
campus (Matthews).
The COVID 19 pandemic in the spring of 2020 poses additional tests to Hungary
and Poland’s failing democracies. This pandemic changes the “No” to a “Yes” in Table 4
under “Significant event/Crisis,” adding a very serious threat to the ability of these
countries to hold on to democracy. The pandemic is an opportunity for Viktor Orban and
Jarosław Kaczyński to grasp power. Orban would appear to be in a better position, as he
is president and is able to use prerogative powers to grasp total control of the country
which he may not give back. Kaczyński, however, has already faced resistance from
Polish president Andrzej Duda in the past (Lyman). Hungary and Poland made moves to
consolidate power. The most notable move being the Hungarian Parliament giving Orban
the right to rule by decree indefinitely in March 2020 (Erlanger). With Kaczyński facing
a bit more resistance to his illiberal democratic values and Orban facing little to none, the
COVID 19 pandemic is a crucial time for the future of Hungary.
Autocrats can come to power in even the strongest democracies. Without
democratic norms in place and checks on their power, anything from a new democracy to
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an established one with citizens who mistrust a democratic system can put it to the test.
Democratic nations are ideal for ensuring the freedom and peace that many citizens
aspire to have, and Hungary and Poland have autocrats who are attempting to create at
the least what they call “illiberal democracies” and at most authoritarian regimes with
themselves in complete control. Zakaria warns of the consequences of leaders in
democratic societies who do not set legal and moral standards, saying “without this inner
stuffing, democracy will become an empty shell, not simply inadequate, but potentially
dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the manipulation of freedom, and the
decay of a common life” (256). With a better understanding of what factors cause a slide
away from democracies, the warning signs and autocrats can be caught earlier. The better
the understanding, the better the ability to build and upkeep strong democracies
worldwide.
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